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trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by 
bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many markets, when (or whether) an agent trades, and at what price, 
depends on his own characteristics (his value, or the cost or quality of his 
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good), as well as on the characteristics of the other traders. In the market 
for new assistant professors of economics, for example, highly qualified job 
candidates tend to leave the market (i.e., to accept job offers) earlier than 
less well-qualified candidates. In the clothing market, high-value buyers 
purchase the new fall fashions as soon as the clothes enter stores, whereas 
low-value buyers purchase later in the season once the clothes go on sale. 
The distribution of the characteristics of active traders also varies over 
time: In the market for new assistant professors, for example, the propor-
tion of active candidates that are highly qualified is larger when the market 
opens than when it closes. In these markets the "trading pattern" at 
each date (i.e., which types of buyers and sellers trade), and the "market 
composition" at each date (i.e., the characteristics of active traders) are 
determined endogenously and vary over time. 
In this paper we introduce a simple model of a nonstationary dynamic 
market with heterogeneous traders in which trading patterns, market com-
positions, and transaction prices are determined endogenously. In the 
market there are two types of buyers, whose values are either "high" or 
"low," initially present in given proportions; all sellers can supply a unit of 
the good at equal cost. After the market opens there is no entry. Each 
period, active traders are randomly matched and bargain bilaterally. In 
the bargaining game one of the traders is randomly selected to make a 
take-it-or-Ieave-it price proposal. Bargaining is under incomplete informa-
tion, as a seller does not know whether his partner has a high or a low 
value. 
We first identify the trading patterns that arise in equilibrium and the 
dynamics of market composition: When cost is high, i.e., aboye the value 
of low-value buyers, but below the value of high-value buyers, the trading 
pattern is always separating (high-value buyers trade, but low-value buyers 
do not trade). When cost is low, i.e., below the values of both types of 
buyers, the case of primary interest, at most three (pure) trading patterns 
arise over the life of the market: in periods where high-value buyers 
are abundant (i.e., when their proportion exceeds a critical threshold we 
identify), the trading pattern is either separating or partially separating 
(high-value buyers trade, and low-value buyers trade only when they 
propose); in periods where high-value buyers are scarce, the trading pattern 
is pooling (both types of buyers trade). Moreover, the transitions from one 
trading pattern to the next are in a particular order: from separating to 
partially separating to pooling. When the market transits from one pure 
trading pattern to the next there may be a single intervening period in 
which the trading pattern is "mixed." In this case market equilibria are 
asymmetric. We establish that the proportion of high-value buyers in the 
market is decreasing over time, and that the trading pattern is eventually 
pooling. 
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Our analysis reveals properties of market equilibria that are in sharp 
contrast with Walrasian equilibrium. Specifically, when cost is low and 
high-value buyers are abundant, the trading pattem is either separating or 
partially separating when the market opens. In this case, trading pattems 
are (constrained) inefficient. (Under efficient trading every match ends with 
trade--see below.) In addition, trade occurs only with delay: low-value 
buyers and sellers remain in the market longer, in expected terms, than 
they would if the trading pattems were efficient. 
Inefficiency and delay arise as sellers price discriminate among 
heterogeneous buyers, regardless of whether information is complete or 
incomplete. Interestingly, as an example in Section 4 demonstrates, equi-
librium surplus may be lower when information is complete rather than 
incomplete. 
As frictions vanish, transaction prices converge to a competitive price, 
even though the trading pattems continue to be inefficient and delay 
persists. Nevertheless, since the length of delay is bounded, asymptotically 
the welfare loss of inefficient trading is zero and each trader obtains his 
competitive equilibrium utility. 
Related Literature 
Our results on trading pattems and their dynamics in nonstationary 
markets with heterogenous traders are novel and have no counterpart in 
the matching and bargaining literature. With the exceptions of Binmore 
and Herrero [1] and Peters [7], who study markets with a single type 
of buyer and a single type of seller, the matching and bargaining literature 
has focused on stationary equilibria (see, for example, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky [8]). 
Our findings that transaction prices are competitive as frictions vanish 
relate to results already in the literature. Gale [2], for example, obtains 
this result in a similar setting, except that information is complete. His 
work, however, does not address equilibrium dynamics or the efficiency of 
trading pattems, which are central issues in our work. In fact, markets 
exhibit interesting dynamics even when information is complete (see 
Section 4). 
Serrano and Yosha [12] study whether transaction prices are com-
petitive in a model inspired by Wolinsky [14 ]-see also Samuelson [9]. In 
their framework a trader may bargain either "tough" or "soft." If both 
traders in a match bargain tough, the outcome is no trade. Otherwise, 
the pair of bargaining positions determines at which of one of three 
exogenously given prices they trade. For the one-sided asymmetric informa-
tion case (they also study the "two-sided" asymmetric information case, 
which we do not deal with here), they show that when cost is low and 
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frictions are small, market equilibria are efficient and exhibit no delay. 
Price restrictions appear to play an important role in these results, which 
are at odds with those we obtain. In our model prices are fully endogenous; 
i.e., buyers and sellers can make arbitrary price offers. 
There are several papers studying the efficiency of decentralized markets; 
see, e.g., Sattinger [10], Serrano and Yosha [11], and Jackson and Palfrey 
[4]. In a framework similar to ours, Jackson and Palfrey [4] show that 
there is a robust distribution of buyer and seller values for which equi-
librium is inefficient for every bargaining game in a general class. Using 
Jackson and Palfrey's notion of efficiency, we show that although trading 
patterns may be inefficient, as frictions vanish the welfare loss due to inef-
ficient trading vanishes. Thus, the simple bargaining game in which traders 
make take-it-or-leave-it price offers yields asymptotically efficient outcomes 
(despite the fact that trading patterns are inefficient). Hence J ackson and 
Palfrey's result loses significance when frictions are small. 
Our work also relates to a large literature studying price dispersion and 
sales. Varian [13], for example, shows that sales provide a means for 
sellers to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. 
In our model price discrimination arises as a consequence of the differential 
willingness of high- and low-value buyers to endure delay. This yields a 
remarkable parallel between seller behavior in our model and the behavior 
of a durable good monopolist-see, e.g., Hart and Tirole [3]. 
2. THE MODEL 
A market for a single indivisible commodity operates from period ° to T, 
where T may be finite or infinite. At period 1 = ° there is a continuum of 
buyers and sellers, present in equal measures; no new traders enter the 
market subsequently. Each seller is endowed with a single unit of the 
indivisible good. Each buyer is endowed with one unit of money. Buyers 
and sellers preferences are characterized by, respectively, their values and 
costs: All sellers (S) have the same cost, e ~ 0, whereas there are two types 
of buyers, "high-value" (H) and "low-value" (L), whose values are, respec-
tively, uH and uL , where 1 ~ uH > uL ~ O. We assume throughout that 
uH > C. At date zero, high-value and low-value buyers are present in the 
population of buyers in proportions b{[ E (O, 1) and b~ = 1 - b{[, respec-
tively. If a buyer whose value is u' trades with a seller at the price p in time 
1, they obtain a utility of (Y(u' - p) and (Y(p - e), respectively. Here 
J E (O, 1), the discount factor, expresses the traders' impatience.2 A buyer or 
a seller who never trades obtains a utility of O. 
2 When T is finite our results also hold for J = 1. 
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Each period every buyer (seller) remammg in the market meets a 
randomly selected seller (buyer) with probability tx., where tx.E(O, 1).3 A 
matched seller does not observe the buyer's value. When a buyer and a 
seller meet, one of them is selected randomly (with probability !) to 
propose a price at which to trade. If the proposed price is accepted by the 
other party, then the agents trade at that price and both leave the market. 
Otherwise, the agents remain in the market at the next date and wait for 
a new match. An agent who is not matched in the current period also 
remains in the market at the next date. A trader observes only the outcome 
of his own matches. 
A strategy for a trader of type rE {H, L, S} is a pair (p', r'), where p' 
is a sequence (of real numbers) indicating the price otTers the trader would 
make at each date if matched and selected to propose a price, and r' is a 
sequence of reservation prices specifying the maximum (minimum) price 
that a buyer (seller) would accept at each date if responding to a price otTer. 
A strategy distribution is a triple (p, r, A) = [ (pH¡, rH¡, AH¡)~ l' (pLt, rL¡, A L¡)t l' 
(pS¡, rS¡, A s¡)7~ ¡], where for each rE {H, L, S}, A 'k> O is the proportion of 
type r players using strategy (p'k, r'k), and n' is the (countable) number of 
distinct strategies used by (a positive measure of) type r traders. Note that 
L.~'= 1 A 'k = 1. 
We do not restrict attention to symmetric strategy distributions (i.e., 
ditTerent agents of the same type may follow ditTerent strategies). 
Indeed, allowing asymmetric strategy distributions is necessary to guarantee 
existence of a market equilibrium-see the discussion on symmetry and the 
example provided in Moreno and Wooders [5, Section 4]. We consider 
only strategies in which a trader does not condition his actions in the 
current match on the history of his prior matches, but this restriction is 
inconsequentia1.4 For simplicity, we restrict attention to strategy distribu-
tions where only countably many distinct strategies are used. As we shall 
see, however, for discount factors near or equal to one, in equilibrium at 
most two ditTerent strategies are played by each type of trader. 
2.1. Laws of Motion 
Given a strategy distribution (p, r, A), for rE {H, L, S} and k ~ n' let A? 
denote the proportion of agents following the kth type r strategy out of the 
3 We rule out the case oc = 1 in order to ensure that a positive measure of each type of agent 
is present at aH times, so that the laws of motion described in Section 2.1 are weH defined. 
4 Since a trader only observes the outcomes of his own matches, his decision problem, and 
therefore his reservation price, is the same regardless of his history in prior matches-see 
Osborne and Rubinstein [6, pp. 154-162]. Thus, for any equilibrium in which the players' 
strategies depend on histories, there is another equilibrium in history-independent strategies 
resulting in identical transaction prices, trading patterns, and market compositions. 
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total measure of agents of type r who remain in the market at time t. 
(Throughout, we use i, j, and k, respectively, to index the strategies of 
buyers, sellers, and generic traders.) This proportion can be computed for 
tE {O, ... , T}, given A~k=ATk, as 
where z? denotes the probability that a trader who is matched at t and 
who follows the strategy (p?, r?) trades at t. (We shall also sometimes 
interpret A? as a probability; e.g., A~j is the probability that a buyer 
matched at t is matched with a seller following the jth seller strategy.) The 
probability z? is computed as follows: For x, y E IR denote by I(x, y) the 
indicator function, whose value is 1 if x ~ y, and ° otherwise. Writing 
B = { H, L} for the set of buyer types, then for r E B we have 
nS nS 
ZT¡=!" ASjJ¡(pT¡ rSj)+!" A SjJ¡(r T¡ pSj) 
t 2L.. t t' t 2L.. t t' t· 
j=l j=l 
For sellers, this probability is given by 
'CEB ;=1 'tEB i=l 
where b;, the proportion of the buyers of type r out of the total measure 
of buyers remaining in the market at time t, can be computed for t > 0, 
given b~, as 
and z; = L7~ 1 A;¡Z;¡ is the probability that a randomly selected type 
rE { H, L, S} trader who is matched at t trades at t. Since there is a con-
tinuum of traders, the market evolves deterministically, even though a 
trader's own market experience is stochastic. 
2.2. Value Functions 
Given a strategy distribution (p, r, A), the expected utility at time t of an 
agent of type r E { H, L, S} who is using strategy r k is 
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In this expression, P? (R?) is the expected utility to a trader of type T 
following the kth type T strategy who is matched at t and selected to 
propose (respond to) a price offer. These expected utilities can be 
calculated for r E B as 
and 
For sellers we have 
n' 
p~j=(p~j-C) ¿ b; I A;iJ(r?,p~j) 
'EB ;=1 
and 
n' 
R:j = I b; I A;i(p;i - e) I(p;i, r:j ) 
<EB ;=1 
+(1- ¿ b; f A;iI(p;i,r~j))ov~:-I. 
TEB i=1 
When T is finite, these expected utilities are calculated using vi + I = ° for 
TE {H, L, S} and k ~ n'. 
2.3. Equilibrium 
A strategy distribution (p, r, A) is a market equilibrium if for each tE 
{O, ... , T}, each TE B and i E {l, ... , n<}, and each j E {l, ... , nS } 
(E.l) 
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and 
n' 
p~jEargmax(x-c) ¿ b; ¿ A;iI(r;i,x) 
x TEB 
+(1- ¿ b; f A;iI(r;i,X))JV~~l. 
TEB i= 1 
Condition (E.l) requires that at each date a trader's reservation price 
makes him indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer of his reserva-
tion price. Condition (E.l) builds perfection into our equilibrium notion by 
requiring that an agent accepts any price offer which gives him a higher 
utility that he would obtain by rejecting the offer. Condition (E.2) ensures 
that price offers are optimal. Given the recursive nature of our setting, 
in a market equilibrium traders' strategies are globally optimal; i.e., no 
trader can do better by changing his reservation prices or price offers 
simultaneously at more than one date. 
In a market equilibrium, traders form their expectations of the propor-
tion of buyers of each type remaining in the market (b;), and the propor-
tion of traders following each of the strategies being played (A?), on 
the basis of the strategy distribution being played. Moreover, each trader 
maximizes his expected utility at each of his information sets. Thus, the 
notion of market equilibrium is in the spirit of sequential (or Bayes perfect) 
equilibrium. 
Existence of market equilibria under general conditions is established in 
Moreno and Wooders [5] by means of a fixed point argumento It might 
seem that if T were finite one could calculate a market equilibrium via 
backward induction. Computing a traders' reservation price and optimal 
price offer at a date t, however, requires knowing the market composition 
(i.e., the proportion of traders of each type present in the market) at t, as 
well as his expected utility if he remains in the market at t + 1. Since the 
market composition at date t is determined by the trading patterns (and 
the traders' strategies) prior to t, a market equilibrium cannot be computed 
by backward induction. 
2.4. Trading Patterns and Efficiency 
Characterizing market equilibria requires determining the "trading pat-
terns" that may arise. We classify the matches into four types, depending 
upon the buyer's value and who proposes: (i) a high-value buyer proposes 
(to a seller), (ii) a low-value buyer proposes, (iii) a seller proposes to a 
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high-value buyer, and (iv) a seller proposes to a low-value buyer. A trading 
pattern at a given date 1 specifies the proportion of each type of match that 
ends with trade, and is represented by a vector z t = (z~S, z~s , Z~H, Z~L) E 
[O, 1 ]4. Given a strategy distribution, these proportions are 
n't' nS 
z;S = L A? L A?I(p;', r~j), 
i~l j~l 
and 
nS nt" 
z&= '\' ASj '\' AT¡J,(rT¡ pSj) 
t ¿ t l...J t t' t· 
j~l i~l 
Note that z;=(z;s+z~T)/2 (see Section2.1 aboye). Also note that the set 
of possible trading patterns does not depend upon whether values are 
private information. In a "pure" trading pattern every match of the same 
type has the same outcome (either trade or no trade); i.e., the pure trading 
patterns are the elements of [O, 1 t whose coordinates are either zeros or 
ones. (Hence there are 16 possible pure trading patterns.) AH other trading 
patterns are "mixed." 
The surplus realized is determined by the sequence of trading patterns. 
Given a sequence z = { Z t} ¡~ o specifying the trading pattern at each date, 
the surplus G( J, T, z) is given by 
where for rE {H, L} 
In this expression, b~(UT -e) gT(J, T, z) is the surplus realized in matches 
of type r buyers and sellers. 
In order to evaluate the welfare properties of alternative market out-
comes, it is useful to have a notion of efficiency. Following Jackson and 
Palfrey [4], we say that a sequence of trading patterns is (conslrained) 
efficienl if it maximizes surplus on the set of all sequences of trading pat-
terns. In the high cost case (e > uL ) the unique efficient sequence of trading 
patterns is separating for each l; i.e., for each l, z~s = Z~H = 1 and z~s = 
Z~L = 0, whereas in the low cost case (e < é) the unique efficient sequence 
of trading patterns is pooling; i.e., for each l, z~s = Z:H = z~s = Z~L = 1. 
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3. PROPERTIES OF MARKET EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we identify the equilibrium trading patterns and their 
dynamics, and study the properties of market equilibria as frictions vanish. 
We begin with the high-cost case. 
3.l. High Cost 
Supply and demand schedules in this case are illustrated below in Fig. la 
(e> uL ). Beginning with this case allows us to discuss the workings of our 
model in a simple environment and facilitates understanding the subtleties 
that arise in the more interesting case where there are gains to trade 
between sellers and both types of buyers. 
(a) 
supply 
e 
, 
demand 
JO" 
(b) ~ 
supply 
c····· .. · ................ ··................................................ demand 
.. 
JO" 
FIG. 1. (a) Supply and demand in the high-cost case. (b) Supply and demand in the 
low-cost case. 
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Market equilibria in this case have a simple structure: at every date high-
value (low-value) buyers offer a price equal to (below) the seller reserva-
tion price, and sellers offer a price equal to the high-value-buyer reserva-
tion price. Thus, only high-value buyers, and the sellers they are matched 
with, trade. Since the trading pattem is separating at each date, the market 
equilibrium is constrained efficient. When traders are sufficientIy patient 
(i.e., J is c10se to 1) and the time horizon is sufficientIy long, transaction 
prices are c10se to the competitive price (i.e., e), and surplus approaches the 
competitive surplus-equal to b{f (u H - e). Intuitively this is because when 
the time horizon is long, high-value buyers eventually become scarce and 
the seller-reservation price approaches c. If high-value buyers are patient, 
their reservation price (at earIy dates) is also c10se to c. These findings are 
summarized in Proposition 1. We provide an informal discussion of these 
results when T < oo. 
Let (p, r, A) be a market equilibrium. As an agent who does not trade 
while the market is open obtains a utility of zero (i.e., V;..+ 1 = O), by (E.l) 
reservation prices at the last date are r!f. = UH, rt= uL , and r~= c. Hence 
r!f. > r~ > rt. It is easy to see that high-value (low-value) buyers offer at 
date T a price equal to (below) the seller-reservation price: A high-value 
(low-value) buyer obtains a utility of uH - r~ = uH - e > O (é - r~ = 
uL - e < O) offering r~, the lowest price accepted by sellers, and obtains 
J v!f.+ 1 = O (J vt+ 1 = O) with a lower price offer. Thus, p!f. = r~ (pt < r~). 
Sellers offer at date T the high-value-buyer reservation price (i.e., the 
highest price accepted by high-value buyers): a seller who offers r!f. obtains 
an expected utility of b!f. (r!f. - e) = bIf, (u H - e) > 0, whereas he obtains 
rt- e = uL - e < O offering rt. Note that bIf, > O since a measure 
(1 - ex) T b{f > ° of high-value buyers has never been matched before T. 5 
Thus, p~= rIf,o Hence the pattem of trade at date T is separating. 
Traders' expected utilities at Tare VIf, = ~ex(UH - e), vt= O, and V~= 
~exbIf,(UH -e). Using (E.l) again we calculate traders' reservation prices at 
T-l to obtain rIf,_I=uH_J~ex(uH_c), rLl=c+J~exbIf,(uH_c), and 
rt_l = é. Thus rIf,_l > r~_l > rt-l' regardless of the value of bIf" and the 
same pattem of trade arises at date T - 1. In fact, it can be shown by induc-
tion that reservation prices satisfY this inequality at every date t, independently 
of b~, and therefore that the pattem of trade is separating at every date. 
Given the initial proportion of high-value buyers in the market and knowing 
the pattem of trade at each date, we can compute the entire evolution of 
51t is interesting to observe that for ex = 1 (and T~ 1 l, a case we haye ruled out, there are 
multiple (eyen asymmetric 1 market equilibria. In an equilibrium aH high-yalue buyers trade at 
date zero; thus, at subsequent dates any price offer aboye e (in fact, aboye él is optimal for 
seHers. This leads to the existence of muItiple equilibria that differ in transaction prices. As .5 
approaches 1 and T approaches infinity, there continue to be muItiple equilibria, but transac-
tion prices approach the competitiye price. 
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the market composition (i.e., the sequence {b~} :=0). Knowing the trading 
pattern and the market composition at each date, the vector of reservation 
prices is computed recursively. Transaction prices are the seller-reservation 
price when high-value buyers propose, and the high-value-buyer reserva-
tion price when sellers propose. 
For each JE(O, 1), T, and TE {H, S}, let rT(J, T) be a sequence of 
equilibrium reservation prices. 
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that e> é. Let (p, r, A) be a market equi-
librium, and let i E {O, ... , T}. 
Reservation priees: 
(PU.1) r? = ri for every TE {H, L, S} and i ~ nT • 
(Pl.1.2) rf>rf>rf. 
Priee offers: 
(P1.2) pfi = rf jor i ~ nH , pf; < rf jor i ~ é, and pfj = rf jor j ~ nS• 
Market eomposition: 
( bH (I-ex) b(l bH P1.3) 1+1= H H< i· (l-ex)b¡+I-b¡ 
Equilibrium surplus: 
(P1.4) G(J, T) = b{[ (uH - e) ex(I-ló~+Ólg~~)T+I). 
Transaetion priees and surplus as frietions vanish: 
(P1.5) Jf T < 00, then 
(P1.5.1) lim'¡_llimT--+ oo ri(J, T)=limT --+ oo lim'¡_1 ri(J, T)=e,for TE {H, S}. 
(P1.5.2) limó-d limT _ 00 G(J, T) = limT --+ 00 limó--> 1 G(J, T) = b{[ (uH - e). 
(P1.6) lf T= 00, then 
(P1.6.1) lim,¡ --+ I ri( J, T) = e,for rE {H, S}. 
(P1.6.2) limó --+ I G(J, T) = b{[(uH - e). 
Figure 2 below shows equilibrium transaction prices for a market in 
which cost is high. The mean transaction price (weighted by the volume of 
trade) is 0.4308, which is near reservation prices in the first few periods 
since most trade occurs within the first few periods. In the competitive 
equilibrium of this market the price is 0.2 and the entire surplus of 0.7520 
goes to high-value buyers. In contrast, in the market equilibrium sellers 
capture 29 % of the total (discounted) surplus of 0.6834, despite the fact 
that frictions are relatively small (the probability that an agent is never 
matched is oc T + I = 1¿24). Even as J approaches one sellers capture 15 % of 
the total surplus of 0.7513. 
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0.6 
0.5 cp----&----<a---~--~ 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
O+---~--~----r_--~--_r--~----r_--~--~ 
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FIG. 2. Equilibrium in the high-cost case (b{{ = 0.94, uH = 1, uL = 0.1, e = 0.2, J = 0.9, 
1X=0.5). 
3.2 Low Cosl 
Figure 1 b illustrates the supp1y and demand schedules for the low-cost 
case (e < uL ). To discuss the difficulties that arise in the analysis, as sume 
that in a market equilibrium (i) traders of the same type have the same 
reservation price, (ii) sellers offer either the high-value-buyer reservation 
price r~ or the low-value-buyer reservation price rf and (iii) r~ > 
max{rf, rf}. (See Proposition 2 below.) When a seller offers r~at date 1, 
he trades only with high-value buyers and obtains an expected utility of 
b7(r7 - e) + (1 -b7)(rf - e). 
(Recall that J vf + 1 = rf - e by (E.1).) A seller who offers rf at date 1 trades 
with both types of buyers, and obtains rf - c. Therefore it is optimal for a 
seller to offer the high-value-buyer reservation price if 
In other words, sellers offer the high-value-buyer reservation price if the 
probability that the current partner is a high-value buyer times the gains 
to trade with high-value buyers is greater than the gains to trade with low-
value buyers. (In both cases, the gains are calculated relative to the reserva-
tion prices, rather than the actual values or costs.) Writing n, for the ratio 
(rf - rf)j(r7 - rf), which measures the relative gains to trade of sellers 
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with low-value buyers versus high-value buyers, the inequality aboye can 
be written as 
Hence, in contrast to the low cost case where the trading pattern is separat-
ing regardless of the market composition, in the present case the trading 
pattern at date t depends on the market composition. Further, the market 
composition at date t is determined in turn by the trading patterns prior 
to t. Thus, the entire sequence of trading patterns and market compositions 
must be determined simultaneously. 
Trading Patterns and Their Dynarnics 
Proposition 2 establishes sorne basic facts about equilibrium price offers 
and reservation prices. Using these facts we identify the trading patterns 
that arise in equilibrium, as weIl as their dynamics. 
PROPOSITION 2. Assurne that e < uL . Let (p, r, A) be a rnarket equilibriurn 
and let iE {O, ... , T}. 
Reservation prices: 
(P2.1.1) r?=rifor every TE {H, L, S} and i~n'. 
(P2.1.2) rf> max{ rf, rf}. 
High-value-buyer price offers: 
(P2.2) pfi = rf ,for every i ~ nH • 
Low-value-buyer price offers: 
(P2.3.1) pfi ~ rf for every i ~ nL • 
(P2.3.2) Assurne T < 00; there is e(iX, T) > O such that if J> 1 - e(iX, T), 
then 
(i) pfi < rf for sorne i ~ nL irnplies P7i < r: for every t < i and i ~ é. 
(ii) pfi = rf for sorne i ~ nL irnplies P7i = r: for every t > i and i ~ nL . 
Seller price offers: 
(P2.4.1) pfj E {rf, rf} for every j ~ nS • 
(P2.4.2) If pfj = rf for sorne j ~ nS , then p:j = r7 for every t> i and j ~ n S • 
(P2.4.3) lf pfj = rf for sorne j ~ nS , then p:j = r~ for every t < i and j ~ n S • 
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Seller and low-value-buyer price ojJers: 
(P2.5) Jf prj = rf for sorne j'::;; é, then pfi = rr for every i'::;; nL . 
Proposition 2 implies that at most three pure trading patterns may arise 
in equilibrium: by (P2.2) every match where a high-value buyer proposes 
ends with trade (i.e., z~s = 1 for aH t), and by (P2.1.2) and (P2.4.1) every 
match where a seHer proposes to a high-value buyer also ends with trade 
(i.e., Z:H = 1 for aH t). In addition, (P2.5) rules out the trading patterns in 
which matches between seHers and low-value buyers end with trade when 
the seHer proposes, but end without trade when the buyer proposes (i.e., 
Z:L = 1 implies z~s = 1). Thus, only three pure trading patterns may arise 
in equilibrium: separating (S), that is, aH matches between high-value 
buyers and seHers end with trade, whereas aH matches between low-value 
buyers and seHers end without trade (i.e., z~s = Z:H = 1, and z~s = Z:L = O); 
partially separating (PS), that is, aH matches between high-value buyers 
and seHers end with trade and matches between low-value buyers and 
seHers end with trade only if the buyer proposes (i.e., z~s = Z:H = z~s = 1, 
and Z:L = O); and pooling (P), that is, aH matches end with trade (i.e., 
z~s = Z:H = z~s = Z~L = 1). The relation between price offers and reserva-
tion prices in each of these trading patterns are summarized in Table 1. 
Mixed trading patterns are not ruled out by Proposition 2. Since aH 
matches between high-value buyers and seHers end with trade, if two 
matches of the same type have different outcomes, they must be matches of 
a low-value buyer and a seHer. Moreover, by (P2.5) if a positive proportion 
of matches where a seHer proposes to a low-value buyer end with trade, 
then aH matches where a low-value buyer proposes end with trade (i.e., 
Z~L > O implies z~s = 1). Hence only mixed trading patterns of the form 
z~s = Z~H = 1, z~s E (O, 1) and Z~L = O, referred to as "S-PS," and 
z~s =Z~H =z~s = 1, Z~L E (0,1), referred to as "PS-P," may arise in equi-
librium. Proposition 2 ensures that a PS-P trading pattern arises in at 
most one period (P2.4.3). Moreover, when T is finite and the discount fac-
tor is sufficiently high, a S-PS trading pattern arises in at most one period, 
TABLE 1 
Equilibrium Pure Trading Patterns when e < uL 
Trading patterns 
Separating 
Partially separating 
Pooling 
Sellers 
p~=r~ 
p~=r~ 
p~=rf 
Price otTers 
High value 
p~=r~ 
p~=r~ 
p~=r~ 
Low value 
pf<r~ 
pf=r~ 
pf=r~ 
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since by (P2.302) once a positive proportion of low-value buyers offer the 
seller reservation price, at subsequent periods alllow-value buyers offer this 
priceo 
Proposition 2 also yields conclusions concerning the order in which trad-
ing patterns ariseo (P2.4.2) establishes that if at date t a positive proportion 
of sellers offer the low-value-buyer reservation price, then at every subse-
quent date all sellers offer this price (ioeo, Z:L > O implies z:¡ 1 = 1)0 Hence 
the S, S-PS, and PS trading patterns (when they arise) precede the PS-P 
and P trading patternso Then (P2.3.2) implies that the S trading pattern 
precedes all the other trading patterns (because z~s > O implies z~f 1 = 1), 
and that the s-ps mixed trading pattern precedes PSo (P2.402) implies that the 
PS-P mixed trading pattern precedes Po Hence, trading patterns arise in the 
following order: S, S-PS, PS, PS-P, and Po Of course, an equilibrium may 
exhibit only sorne of these patternso In particular, the mixed trading patterns 
may be skipped (although the subset of the parameter space where all market 
equilibria exhibit mixed trading patterns is not negligible)o 
Market Composition 
The market composition and the trading patterns intertwineo In both the 
S and the PS trading patterns, as well as in mixed trading patterns S-PS 
and PS-P the proportion of high-value buyers in the market is falling: in 
S, each period a fraction ex of high-value buyers exits the market, while no 
low-value buyer exits; in PS a fraction ex of high-value buyers and a frac-
tion ~ of low-value buyers exit the market each periodo In the trading pat-
terns P the same fraction ex of each type of buyer exits the market at each 
date, and hence the proportion of high-value buyers in the market remains 
constant. Thus, the proportion of high-value buyers in the market 
decreases (quickly in S, and more slowly in PS), but once P is reached, it 
becomes stationaryo Proposition 3 establishes that trading patterns and the 
dynamics of market composition are governed by the relation of the 
proportion of high-value buyers in the market to the critical threshold 
n* = (é - c)/(uH - c) 
PROPOSITION 30 Assume that c < uLo Let (p, r, A) be a market equilibrium 
and let iE {O, 000, T}o 
The critical threshold (n*): 
(P301.1) If bf < n*, then pfj = rf for every j::( nS and bf+ 1 = bf. 
(P301.2) Jf bf =n*, then pfi= rf for every i::(é, and either 
(i) bf+ 1 < bf, or 
(ii) bfr 1 = bf, and p~j = r~ for every j::( nS and t ~ io 
(P301.3) Jfbf>n*, thenpfj=rf for every j::(ns, and bf+l <bfo 
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The critical threshold is eventually reached: 
(P3.2) There is T= T(b{{, ex, n*) such that if T> T, then bf::::; n* for t ~ T. 
Proposition 3 establishes that if bf < n*, then the trading pattern at t 
and subsequent periods is P (P3.1.1). If bf>n*, then Z:L=O, and there-
fore the trading pattern at t (and prior to t) is either S, a S-PS, or PS 
(P3.1.3). When bf =n* the trading pattern at t is either PS, a PS-P, or P 
but it is P at every subsequent period (P3.1.2). If the time horizon is suf-
ficientIy long, then the proportion of high-value buyers in the market is 
eventually less than or equal to n* (P3.2), and therefore by (P3.1.1) and 
(P3.1.2) the trading pattern is eventually P and remains P. 
Efficiency and Delay 
In the low-cost case the unique efficient sequence of trading patterns is 
P at every date; i.e., zfs = Z:H = z;s = Z:L = 1 for all t. Hence, by (P3.1.1) 
the sequence of equilibrium trading patterns is efficient whenever b{{ < n*. 
If b{{ > n*, however, the trading pattern at date O, and possibly afterward, 
is either S or PS, and therefore the sequence of equilibrium trading patterns 
is inefficient. Furthermore, since the critical threshold n* does not depend 
on either the discount factor or the time horizon, if b{{ > n* the sequence 
of equilibrium trading patterns is inefficient even as frictions vanish. 
(Proposition 4 below, however, establishes that the welfare loss due to 
inefficient trading approaches zero as frictions vanish.) 
Figure 3 shows an equilibrium for a market that opens for 10 periods 
and whose parameter values are those specified. In this equilibrium all 
three pure trading patterns arise. The top graph in Fig. 3 shows transaction 
prices. The trading pattern is S for periods O to 2. It is PS for periods 3 to 
7. In period 8 and 9 the good goes on "sale" (as sellers switch from offering 
the high-value-buyer reservation price to the low-value-buyer reservation 
price) and the trading pattern is P. The bottom graph shows the evolution 
of the market composition and the ratio n/. 
The set of competitive prices for the market in Fig. 3 is the interval 
[0.2,0.4]. We focus on the competitive price ofO.3, since in a market equi-
librium all transactions are at this price as frictions vanish (see Proposi-
tion 4). Table II shows the distribution of the surplus in four different set-
tings: (i) at the (static) competitive equilibrium when price is 0.3; (ii) under 
efficient trading when price is 0.3; (iii) in the market equilibrium displayed 
in Fig. 3; and (iv) in the market equilibrium when information is complete 
(we comment on this last example in Section 4). Interestingly, in the 
market equilibrium displayed in Fig. 3 sellers capture more than twice the 
surplus than they capture in the competitive equilibrium. The market equi-
librium is not efficient, since low-value buyers do not trade when matched 
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FIG. 3. Equilibrium in the low-cost case (b{[ = 0.94, uH = 1, é =0.4, e = 0.2, <5 = 0.9, IX = 0.5). 
in periods O through 2 and trade only if they propose in periods 3 through 7. 
The efficiency 10ss is small (0.0042 = 0.6943 - 0.6901) since only 6 % of the 
buyers are 10w-value at the market open. In this example, 10w-value buyers and 
sellers experience delay. Conditional on trading, a low-value buyer remains in 
the market an average of6.18 periods in equilibrium, whereas he would remain 
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TABLE 11 
The Division of Surplus 
Surplus 
Trading High value Low value Seller Total 
Competitive 0.6580(86%) 0.0060 (0.7%) 0.1000(13%) 0.7640 
Efficient 0.5980 (86 % ) 0.0055 (0.7%) 0.0909 ( 13 % ) 0.6943 
Incomp. info. 0.4740 (69%) 0.0033 (0.4%) 0.2128 (30%) 0.6901 
Comp. info. 0.4353 (63 %) 0.0018 (0.2%) 0.2526 (36%) 0.6897 
in the market an average of only 1.99 periods under efficient trading. The 
length of the delay experienced by sellers is small because high-value buyers 
are abundant (b{[ = 0.96) and they trade with no delay. 
Market Equilibria as Frietion Vanish 
Proposition 4 below establishes that as frictions vanish (i) transaction 
prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price p* = (é + e)j2, 
(ii) each trader receives his competitive equilibrium utility, and (iii) the 
surplus approaches the unconstrained surplus (equal to b{[ (uH - e) + 
(l-b{[)(é-e) in this case). For each JE(O, 1) and T, denote by r(J, T) 
the set of all sequences of equilibrium reservation prices, and by V(J, T) 
the set of all sequences of equilibrium expected utilities. (Since a market 
equilibrium always exists, these sets are nonempty.) AIso denote by G(J, T) 
the set of all possible surpluses realized in equilibrium (i.e., the set of 
surpluses associated with the equilibrium trading pattems). 
PROPOSITION 4. Assume that e < uL • 
(P4.1) If T < 00, then for every i E {O, ... , T}: 
(P4.1.1) limo_¡limT_oorj(J, T)=limT_oolimo_¡rj(J, T)=p* for TE 
{H, L, S}. 
(P4.1.2) limo_¡ lim T _ oo Vj(J,T)=limT_ oo limo_¡ Vj(J,T)=u'-p* 
for TE {H, L}; limo_¡ lim T_ 00 Vf(J, T) = limT _ 00 limo_¡ Vf(J, T) = 
p*-e. 
(P4.1.3) limo_¡limT _ oo G(J, T)=limT _ oo limo_¡ G(J, T)=b{[(uH-c) 
+b~(é-c). 
(P4.2) If T = 00, then for every i E {O, ... , T}: 
(P4.2.1) limo _ ¡ rj( J, T) = p* for TE {H, L, S}. 
(P4.2.2) limo_¡ Vj(J, T) = u' - p*, for TE {H, L}, and limo_¡ Vf(J, T) 
=p* -e. 
(P4.2.3) limo_¡ G(J, T) = b{[ (u H - e) + b~(é - e). 
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Although transaction prices converge to a competitive price, de1ay per-
sists even as market frictions vanish and, in this sense, the market outcome 
is not competitive. Consider a market in which b{! > n* and let (p, r, A) be 
a market equilibrium. By Proposition 3 the trading pattern is either S, 
S-PS, or PS at the market open. Define the sequence {º~} as º{! =b{! and, 
for t ~O 
(l-ex) º~ + l-º~· 
The sequence {º~} describes the evolution of the market composition as 
though the trading pattern is always S. Since the proportion of high-value 
buyers in the market falls more quickly in S than in the other trading pat-
terns, then b~ ~ º~ for all t ~ o. Therefore, if 1 is the smallest integer such 
that º~ :( n*, then we have b~ > n* for t <1; hence the trading pattern is 
either -S, an S-PS, or PS for periods O through 1- 1. Thus, low-value 
buyers and sellers experience delay. 
Since 1 is independent of the time horizon and the discount factor, de1ay 
persists even as frictions vanish. The surplus, however, approaches the 
unconstrained surplus, and therefore the we1fare loss of inefficient trading 
approaches zero as friction vanish. This is a consequence of the fact that 
the length of delay is bounded (because the number of periods before the 
trading pattern is always pooling is bounded aboye, see (P3.2)), and 
therefore the cost of delay approaches zero as frictions vanish. 
4. MODELING ISSUES AND EXTENSIONS 
We analyze a market with one-sided incomplete information and equal 
measures of buyers and sellers. Our setup, however, can accornmodate 
other markets. In this section we discussion sorne interesting extensions. 
4.1. Complete Information 
Under complete information (i.e., when sellers observe buyers' values) 
sellers may condition their price offers on the buyer's value. Our model can 
be readily modified to accornmodate this possibility. It is easy to show that 
in the high-cost case the analog of Proposition 1 holds. In the low-cost 
case, the main difference is that the PS trading pattern never arises; low-
value buyers and sellers trade whenever r; > r~, because sellers can dis-
criminate between high- and low-value buyers. As the example in Fig. 4 
shows, the S, the P, and the even mixed trading patterns (when r; = r~) may 
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FIG. 4. Equilibrium in the low-cost case----<:omplete information (b{f =0.94, UN = 1, 
uL = 0.4, e = 0.2, <5 = 0.9, oc = 0.5). 
arise in equilibrium. In Fig. 4 seller price offers to high-value and low-value 
buyers are denoted by p~L and p~H respectively. 
The parameter values for this market are the same as in Fig. 3, but infor-
mation is now complete. The trading pattern is S in periods 0-4, it is mixed 
at period 5, and it is P thereafter. High-value buyers are worse offwhen infor-
mation is complete than when it is incomplete (see Table Il) because they no 
longer trade at "sale" prices (i.e., at the low-value buyer reservation price). 
Sellers are better off because even in the pooling trading pattern they trade 
at the high-value buyer reservation price when proposing to high-value 
buyers, and because they trade WÍth no delay with low-value buyers whenever 
r;- > r~. Low-value buyers are worse off because, except in the last period, 
sellers have higher reservation prices. Perhaps surprisingly, the surplus 
realized in equilibrium is less when information is complete (0.6897) than 
when it is incomplete (0.6901). It is easy to construct examples in which the 
opposite inequality holds. Hence, whereas heterogeneity is clearly a source of 
inefficiency, the presence of asymmetric information may enhance efficiency. 
4.2. Unequal Measures 
Our assumption that buyers and sellers are present in the market in 
equal measures does not seem to be a significant restriction as unequal 
measures can be equalized by introducing a positive measure of a nontrading 
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FIG. 5. (a) Two-sided uncertainty (eH> uH). (b) Two-sided uncertainty (eH < uH). 
type. For example, the low-cost case in which there is a measure 1 of 
buyers and a measure SL of sellers, with SL < 1, can be modelled by intro-
ducing a measure 1 - SL of sellers, each with unit cost eH, where eH is 
greater than uH , so that supply and demand are as given in Fig. 5a. By the 
same reasoning, our model of the high-cost case can be interpreted as a 
model of the situation where (high-value) buyers are present in the market 
in smaller measure than sellers (and low-value buyers are a nontrading 
type introduced to equalize measures). Introducing new types, however, 
renders the analysis more cumbersome when it makes the information 
uncertainty "two-sided." 
4.3. Two-Sided Ineomplete Information 
When uncertainty is two-sided as in Figs. 5a and 5b, the evolution of 
the market composition at each date is described by the proportion of 
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high-value buyers (b~) and low-cost sellers (s7), which are determined 
endogenously by the trading patterns. In addition, the number of feasible 
(pure) trading patterns increases significantly (a trading pattern now is 
represented by an 8-dimensional vector). 
The example in Fig. 6 suggests the features of market equilibrium when un-
certainty is two-sided. In the example, supply and demand are qualitatively the 
same as in Fig. 5b. For simplicity, the example is developed for the case oc = 1 
and J = 1, so that the only friction present is the finite horizon. We denote by 
p~B (r~B) the price offer (reservation price) ofhigh-value buyers at time t. Price 
offers and reservation prices for low-value buyers (LB), high-cost sellers 
(HS) and low-cost sellers (LS) are denoted analogously. 
The graph in Fig. 6 shows transaction prices. The table below the graph 
gives b~, s7 , n~ and n: for periods O through 9, where n~ = 
(r7B - r7S)/(r~B - r7S) and n~ = (r~B - r~S)/(r~B - r7S). The vertical lines 
in Fig. 6 separate distinct trading patterns. Equilibrium price offers depend 
upon the relation of b~ to n~, s7 to n:, and the sign of n~ and n~. For 
example, whether a high-value buyer offers the high or low-cost seller reser-
vation price depends on the relation of s7 to n:. Since r~s > r7s , a high-
value buyer obtains r~B - r~s if he offers r~s (this offer is accepted by both 
types of sellers); he obtains the expected gain of s7 (r~B - r7S) if he offers 
r7s (this offer is accepted only by low-cost sellers). Hence high-value buyers 
offer r7s if s7> n: and offer r~s if s7 < n:. In the example, high-value 
buyers offer r7s in periods O to 4 and offer r~s in periods 5 to 9. Whether 
low-value buyers offer r7s or make a smaller (rejected) price offer depends 
on the sign of n~. If n~ > O then r7B> r7s , and low-value buyers offer r7s ; 
otherwise they make price offers which are rejected. In the example, low-
value buyers make price offers which are rejected in periods O to 2, but 
offer the low-cost seller reservation price thereafter. Similarly, low-cost 
sellers offer r~B if b~ > n~, and r7B if b~ < n~; high-cost sellers offer r~B if 
n~ > O, and make rejected offers otherwise. 
Qualitatively, the trading patterns of this example are similar to the low-
cost case: high-value buyers and low-cost sellers always trade; in periods O 
to 2 there is no other trade; from period 3 on, low-value buyers trade when 
they propose to low-cost sellers; from period 4 on, high-cost sellers trade 
when they propose to high-value buyers; from periods 5 to 9 all matches 
(except those between low-value buyers and high-cost sellers) end with 
trade. In equilibrium the average price received by sellers is 0.4164, which 
is close to 0.4, the competitive price. Note that in period 4 low-cost sellers 
trade with both types of buyers, and hence in later periods only high-cost 
sellers remain (i.e., s7 = O). In period 5 high-value buyers trade with both 
types of sellers, and hence in later periods only low-value buyers remain. 
Thus, after period 5 there is no trade, since only low-value buyers and 
high-cost sellers remain in the market. 
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FIG. 6. Equilibrium with two-sided uncertainty (b{f = 0.94, s~ = 0.98, uH = 1, uL = 0.4, 
eH =0.6, eL = 0.2, 0=0:= 1). 
As this example illustrates, our model is easily modified to accommodate 
the two-sided incomplete information case. However, the introduction ofnew 
endogenous variables and the enlargement of the set of possible trading 
patterns makes the study of this case considerable more complexo An analysis 
ofthe trading patterns, dynamics, efficiency, and the asymptotic properties of 
market equilibria for this case is an important topic for future research. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 1 TO 4 
We begin stating a number of lemmas-see Moreno and Wooders [5] 
for proofs. Throughout assume that (p, r, .:1.) is a market equilibrium. 
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LEMMATA. VtE {O, ... , T}: 
1. VrE {H, L, S}, Vk, k' E {l, ... , n'}: 
(Ll.1) r? = r?'; 
(L1.2) R?=R?'; 
(L1.3) P? = P?'; 
(L1.4) V?= V?,. 
2. VrE {H, L}, Vi~n': 
(L2.l) p;i ~ r~; 
(L2.2) r; > r~ = p;i = r~; 
(L2.3) r;<r~=p;i<r~. 
3. If r~ > max { r;, rn then Vi ~ nS : 
( L3 1) s. E {L H} . . P/ rt , rt , 
(L3.2) b~ <nt =p~j=r;; 
(L3.3) b~ =nt =P~(r~) =P~(r;); 
(L3.4) b~>nt=p~j=r~. 
4. (L4.l) r~ > r;; 
(L4 2) VH _ V L ,,;::. ( H _ L) 1- 0T-I+I(1-ot)T-I+1 • t t ""IX. U U 1 0(1 ot) • 
6. (L6.l) p~i = r~, Vi ~ nH ; 
(L6.2) Z~i= 1, Vi~nH; 
(L6.3) P~=uH-r~; 
(L6.4) R;=é-r;; 
(L6.5) R~ = r~ - c. 
7. The sequence {b~} ¡:OI is decreasing. 
For 8 to 12 assume that e < uL • 
8. (L8.l) p~j=r; Vi~ns and nt=n* =nt-l =n*; 
(L8.2) p~j=r; Vi~ns and nt<n*=nt_l <n*. 
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9. (L9.1) b~~n*~nt~n*~nt_l; 
(L9.2) b~>n*~nt~n*>nt_l; 
(L9.3) b~~n*~nt andp~j=r~ jor somej~é~n*>nt_l. 
10. Assume that there is t ~ T sueh that n* = nt jor tE {t, ... , T}: 
(LlO.1) b~ < n* ~ n* =nsjor s~ t; 
(LlO.2) b~ = n* ~ either b~+ 1 < n* or b~ = n* jor S ~ t; 
(LlO.3) b~>n*~n*~nsjor s~t. 
11. Assume T < OO. There is e(ex, T) > O su eh that if J E [1- e(ex, T), 1], 
then r~ - r~ ~ O ~ r~ _ 1 - r~ _ 1 < O. 
12. Assume T = oo. There is T < 00 sueh that jor t ~ T: z~s = Z~H = z~s = 
Z~L = 1 (i.e., the trading pattern is pooling), r; = r' '<Ir: E {H, L, S}, and 
nt=n*. 
We are now ready to prove Propositions 1 to 4. 
Prooj oj Proposition 1. (P1.l.1) ho1ds by (Ll.1), and (P1.1.2) follows 
from (L5.1) and the fact that r~ ~ e > é ~ r~ for tE {O, ... , T}. A1so (P1.2) 
is implied by (Pl.1.2), (L2.2), (L2.3), and (L3.4). In order to prove (P1.3), 
note that (P1.2) implies I(p~i,r~)=I(r~,p~j)=O for i~nL, j~nS and 
t E {O, ... , T}; therefore Z~i = O for i ~ é and t E {O, ... , T}. AIso since Z~i = 1 
for i ~ nH and tE {O, ... , T} by (L6.2), we have 
bH = b~_I(l-exz~_I) 
t b~_I(l-exz~_I)+b~_I(1-exz~_I) 
(l-ex) b~_1 H 
( l-ex)bH +l-bH <bt_ l · 1-1 1-1 
As for (P1.4), the surplus realized in equilibrium can be readily calculated 
from (S.1 )-(S.2). Note that (P1.2) implies that the equilibrium trading 
patterns, i, satisfy i~s = i:H = i~ = 1 and i~s = i~L = i~ = O. Hence (S.2) 
yields gL (J, T, i) = O, and 
gH(J, T, i) =ex+J(l-ex) ex+ ... +JT (1-ex)T ex 
ex( 1 - J T + 1 ( 1 _ ex) T + 1 ) 
1-J(l-ex) 
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Substituting in (S.l) yields 
_ H H a(l-JT+l(l-a)T+l) 
G(J,T)=G(J,T,z)=bo(u -e) 1-J(1-a) , 
which establishes (P1.4). (P1.5.2) and (P1.6.2) foHow immediately. 
We prove (P1.5.l). AH transactions are at either the high-value-buyer or 
the seHer reservation price. These prices are determined, for t < T, by the 
system of difference equations 
(RH) 
Thus, since 1 - ~(1 + b::) ~ 1 - ~ for each k, we have 
[ 
1_JT-t(1_~)T-1 1 
,,;v -e) (I-á) (~) +JT -' (¡-ir' . 
1-15 1--
2 
AIso from aboye we have for each t 
H (1-a)b~_1 (l-arb{{ 
b l =(l-a)bH +l-bH =l-[l-(l-a)t]bH" t-l t-l o 
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where 
Y/t(O, T) = f ok-t (1 _~)k [1 _ O +~ OT-k+ 1 (1_~)T-kJ. 
k=t+l 2 2 2 
If T < 00, then 
1_oT - t 1-~ ( )
T-t 
( 
OC)t+l 2 
Y/t(o, T) = (1-0)0 1-"2 ( OC) 
1-0 1--
2 
and since limT~oo(T-t)(1-~)T =0, we have 
lim lim Y/t(o, T) = lim lim Y/t(o, T) = O. 
T-+oo 0--+1 0-+1 T--+oo 
If T= 00, then 
( 
OC)t+l 1 
limY/f(0,T)=lim(1-0)0 1--2 ()=O. o~l o~l 1-0 1-~ 
2 
Since r~ ~ c, if T < 00 we have 
lim lim r~ = lim lim r~ = c; 
T-+oo 0--+1 15-+1 T-+oo 
and if T = 00 we have limo ~ 1 r~ = c. AIso, the aboye inequality and 
(Pl.1.2) imply 
[ 
( ) T-t 1 1_oT - t 1-~ s H H 2 T-t oc T-t S 
'. <'. '" (u -,) (1 - o) (.) + J ( I -:2) + ' •. 
1-0 1--
2 
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Hence if T < 00 we have 
lirn 
T_oo 
lirn r~ = lirn lirn r~ = e; 
0--+1 0-+1 T---t>oo 
and if T=oo we have lirno_lr~=c. Therefore, (P1.5.l) and (P1.6.l) 
hold. I 
Proof of Proposition 2. (P2.1.1) is (Ll.l); (P2.1.2) is irnplied by (L4.l) 
and (L5.l); (P2.2) is (L6.l); (P2.3.l) is contained in (L2.l); (P2.4.l) is 
irnplied by (P2.1.2) and (L3.l). 
We prove (P2.3.2). Assume that T< oo. As V~+I = V~+I = V~+I =0, 
by Lernma 11 there is e( oc, T) > O such that if J> 1 - e( oc, T), then r;:O;; rf 
irnplies r; -1 < rf -l' Suppose that J E [1 - e( oc, T), 1 J. If pfi < rf for sorne 
i:O;;nL , then (L2.2) irnplies rf:O;;rf; hence rf_1 <r1-l' and by induction 
r; < rf for t < l; therefore (L2.3) irnplies p;i < rf for every t < 1 and i:O;; nL . 
This establishes (i) of (P2.3.2). Now assurne that pfi' = rf for sorne i' :o;; é, 
and suppose by way of contradiction that pfi" #- r1 for sorne i":o;; nL and 
¡ > l. Then pfi" < r1 by (L2.l). The previous argurnent irnplies p;i < rf for 
every t < ¡ and i:O;; nL ; in particular, pfi' < rf, which is a contradiction. 
We now prove (P2.4.2). If T < 00, since V~+ 1 = V~+ 1 = V~+ 1 = O, we 
have r~ = uH , r~= uL , and r~= e; therefore nT= n*, and hence Lernrna 10 
applies. Assurne that pfj = rf for sorne j :o;; é. Then we have bf:o;; n*, for if 
bf> n* then bf> ni by (LlO.3), and therefore we would have pfj = rf for 
eachj:O;;ns by (L3.4) and (P2.1.2), which is a contradiction. Suppose that 
bf <n*; then nt=n* for each t?;;l by (LlO.l), and therefore Lernma 7 
irnplies b~ < n t for each t?;; l. Thus p fj = r; for every t?;; 1 and j:O;; nS by 
(L3.2). Suppose that bf = n*; then either bf+ 1 < n* or b~ = n* for t?;; 1 by 
(LlO.2). If bf+ 1 < n*, then (LlO.l) again irnplies b~ < nt for each t?;; 1 + 1 
and therefore pfj = r; for every t?;; i + 1 andj:O;; nS , by (L3.2). If b~ = n* for 
t?;; l, since high-value buyers always trade when they are rnatched (by P2.2, 
P2.1.2, and P2.4.l), then low-value buyers rnust al so trade when rnatched; 
hence pfj = r; for every t?;; 1 + 1 and j:O;; é. If T = 00, then there is t such 
that nf'= n* by (Ll2.4), and therefore the sarne argurnents apply. 
We establish (P2.4.3). Suppose by way of contradiction that pfj' = rf for 
sorne j' :o;; é, and p fr = rf for sorne j" :o;; é and ¡ < l. Then (P2.4.2) irnplies 
pfj = r; for every t> ¡ and j:O;; nS . In particular, pf/ = rf, which is a con-
tradiction. 
Finally, we prove (P2.5). If pfj = rf for sorne j:O;; nS then (L3.4) irnplies 
bf:o;; ni, and since bf> O and rf - rf > O, by (L5.l), we have rf - rf > O. 
Hence pfi = rf for every i:O;; nL by (L2.2). I 
Proof of Proposition 3. If T < 00, since V~+ 1 = V~+ 1 = V~+ 1 = O, we 
have nT= n*. If T= 00, then by Lernma 12 there is t such that nt = n* for 
t ?;; t. Hence the assurnptions of Lernrna 10 hold. 
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We prove (P3.1.1). Assume b7 < n*; then b7 < n¡ by (LlO.l), and there-
fore pfJ=rf for j~nS by (L3.2); hence pf;=rf by (P2.5) for every i~nL. 
Thus I(pf;, rf) =I(rf, pfJ) = 1, and therefore 
Since z7i = 1 for each i~nH by (L6.2), we have 
H (l-ex.) b7 H 
b ¡ + 1 = (1 _ ex.) b7 + (l _ ex.) bf = b ¡ . 
We establish (P3.1.2). Assume b7 = n*. Then by (LlO.2) either b7+ 1 < n* 
or b7= .. · =b!f.=n*. If b7+1<n*=b7, then b7+1<n¡+1 (by (LlO.1)), 
and pf~1 =rf+1 for every j~nS by (L3.2). Hence n¡=n*>O by (L8.1), 
and therefore rf> rf (because r7> rf by (P2.1.2)), and (L2.1) implies 
pfi = rf for every i ~ é. If b7 = ... = b!f. = n*, since z~ = 1, then zTi = 1 for 
i ~ nL and t ~ i; hence for t ~ i we have PT; = r: for i ~ nL , and P:J = rT for 
j~ns. 
We show that (P3.1.3) holds. Suppose that b7>n*; then b7>n¡ by 
Lemma(LlO.3), and therefore pfJ=r7 for each j~nS by (L3.4). Since 
r7> rf by (L4.1), then I(rf, pfJ) = O for each j ~ nS , and therefore for each 
i~nL we have 
n S 
L· 1 '\' , S· T( L S.) ~ 1 Z¡'=2 L,., A¡u'p¡,r¡} ""2' 
j~1 
Thus, since z7 = 1 by (L6.2), we get 
H (l - ex.) b7 (1 - ex.) b7 H 
b¡+ 1 = (1 _ ex.) b7 + bf( 1 - ex.zf) ~ (1- ex.) b7 + (1 - ~)(l- b7) < b¡ . 
Finally, we establish (P3.2). Since {b~} is a decreasing sequence by 
Lemma 7, it suffices to show that there is T such that bIf. ~ n*. If b{[ ~ n*, 
take T=O. Assume that b{[>n*; w show that there is T=T(b{[,cx.,n*) 
such that bIf. < n*. Define the sequence {[Jt} by [Jo = b{[, and for t > O 
(1-ex.)[Jt 
[Jt+1 = (1-ex.) [Jt+ (1- ~)(I-[Jt) 
(1_ex.)t+1 b{[ 
(1-ex.)t+1 b{[ + (1- ~y+1 (l-b{[)' 
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We show that b~>n* implies b~+l ~l!t+l' Assume b~>n*; we show by 
induction that bf ~ l!k for k ~ t + 1. By construction b{[ ~ l!o. Assume that 
bf ~ l! k for k ~ t; we show that bf + 1 ~ l! k + l' Since {b~} is nonincreasing 
by Lemma 7 and k ~ t, then bf~ b~ > n*. Therefore (P3.1.3) implies 
pfj = rf, and hence I(rf, p~) = 0, for every j ~ nS. Therefore Zfi ~! for 
every i ~ nL . Since zf = 1, we have 
(1- tX) bf + bf( 1 - tXZf) 
~ (1-tX)l!k 
"'(I-tX)l!k+(I-~)(I-l!k) 
Let T= T(b{[, tX, n*) be the first integer such that l!r<n*. (Such an integer 
exists since {l!t} converges to zero.) We show that b!f. ~ n*. Suppose b!f. > 
n*; then b!f._l > n* by Lemma 7, and hence b!f. ~ l!r< n*, which is a con-
tradiction. Hence (P3.2) holds. I 
Proof of Proposition 4. For each 15 E (O, 1) and T, let rE r( 15, T) be a 
sequence of equilibrium reservation prices and let V be the corresponding 
sequence of expected utilities. By (P3.2) there is T = T(b{[, tX, n*) such that 
if T> T, then b~ ~ n* for t ~ T. Assume that T> T. Thus, (P3.1.1) and 
(P3.1.2) imply p~j=r7<r~ for every j~nS and t~T+l, and therefore 
P7i = r~ for every i ~ é and t ~ T + 1 by (P2.5). Also p~i = r~ for every 
i ~ nH and t by (P2.2). Hence for t ~ T + 1 the trading pattern is pooling 
(i.e., z7 = 1 for t ~ T + 1), and therefore traders' reservation prices for 
t ~ T + 1 are given by the system of difference equations 
l-tX 
tX tX 
- -
[Vl fUH-U<-,] 2 2 [ V~+,] 1-~ tX V L =- uL-c +15 
° 
- V~+l . t 2 2 2 V~ uf-c 
tX tX 
V t+1 
° 
1--
2 2 
The solution of this system, whether T is finite, and therefore V!f.+ 1 = 
V~+ 1 = V~+ 1 = 0, or T is infinite, is 
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for r E {L, S}, and 
H _I!:. ( H _ L _ ) 1 - [J( 1 - a) y - I + 1 
VI -2 2u u e l-J(I-a) 
Hence if T < 00, for t ~ t + 1 we have 
lim 
o~l 
and 
lim 
o~l 
L 
lim V S = lim lim VS = u - e 
T--+oo t T-+oo 6--1 t 2 
= lim lim V;= lim lim V;, 
J .... l T-+oo T-+oo 0--+1 
lim V~ = lim 
T--+oo T-+oo 
L 
l · VH H U +c 1m =u ---o~l I 2 
If T= 00, for t~ t+ 1 we have 
S uL-c . 
lim VI =-2-= hm V;, 
o~l o~l 
and 
L 
• H H U +c 
hm VI =u --2-' 
o~l 
Now let t < t + 1. A trader of type r who is in the market at date t 
obtains an expected utility of V; by following his equilibrium strategy; thus 
the expected utility to a trader who remains in the market at t must satisfy 
V;~JT+I-IVr+l' for otherwise he benefits from a deviation where he 
makes unacceptable offers and rejects any offers until date t + 1, following 
his equilibrium strategy thereafter. Also V~ + V~:::.:; uH - e by (L5.2). Thus 
Also 
Therefore if T < 00 we have 
lim 
o~l 
lim V~ = lim 
T-+oo T-+oo 
uL-c lim Vs __ _ 
o~l t - 2 ' 
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and 
. H H UL+C lim lim V~ = lim bm VI =u --2-. 
0-+1 T-+oo T--+ooo--+l 
Similarly, if T = 00 we have 
and 
l · VH H uL+c 1m =u ---
<>-1 I 2 
For low-value buyers, we can wrÍte the expected utility at time t of a 
low-value buyer who follows the ith low-value buyer strategy as 
ex nS 
+2 L A~j[(uL-p~j)1(r;,p~j)+JV;+I(l-1(r;,p~j))] 
j~1 
+(I-ex)JV;+I· 
Further, (P2.4.l) and (E.I) imply (uL-p~j)1(r;,p~j)+JV;+I(I-
1(r;, p~j)) =JV;+I; and therefore 
Thus, by (L2.l)-(L2.3) and (E.I) this can be rewritten as 
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Assume T < 00 ° If 
then 
lim 
.5->1 
lim V~+ 1 = lim 
T-+ 00 T_ 00 
° L UL-C 
hm V t + I =--, 
.5->1 2 
lim lim v~=-20(max{uL-c-lim lim JV~+I-lim lim JV;+I'O} 
.5-1 T_oo .5-1 T-+oo .5-+1 T-+oo 
and 
lim 
T-+ 00 
Since 
+ lim lim JV~+I 
J--+l T-+oo 
2 
lim V~ =-20( max{é-c- lim 
c5--+ 1 T--+ 00 
limJV~+I- lim limJV;+I'O} 
J--+l T-+oo 0-+1 
+ lim 
T-+ 00 
2 
110 m 1° VL 1° 1° O( (L ) 1 - [J( 1 - O() y - T 1m T+I = 1m 1m - u -c 
.5_1 T_oo .5-1 T-002 l-J(l-O() 
L 
U -c 10 
--= 1m 2 T_ 00 
induction yields 
lim 
.5-1 
lim V~= lim 
T--+ 00 T_ 00 
for t < t + 1. An analogous argument shows that if T = 00, then 
L 
lim VL=u -c 
.5-1 t 2' 
for t < t + 1. Hence (P401.2) and (P4.2.2) holdo 
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Now we prove (P4.1.1) and (P4.2.1). By (E.1) we have r~=c+JV~+1 
and r;=uT-JV;+1 for rE{H,L}. Therefore if T<oo the aboye limits 
imply 
lim lim r; = lim 
o~l T---+oo T-oo 
• T u
L + e 
11m rt =-2-' 
¿;~l 
for rE {H, L, S} and tE {O, ... , T}. If T= 00, then 
L 
l . T U + e 1mr =--¿;~l t 2 
for rE {H, L, S}, and tE {O, ... , T}. 
Finally, given a sequence of equilibrium trading patterns, z, the surplus 
realized can be calculated from Eqs. (S.1) and (S.2) in Section 2. Since 
z~ = 1 by (L6.2), we have 
oc( 1 - J T+ 1 (1 _ oc) T + 1 ) 
1 -J(I- oc) 
AIso for t> T= T(b{[, oc, n*) the trading pattern is pooling, i.e., z;- = 1, and 
hence for T> T we have 
gL(J, T, z) = ocz~ + J(1- ocz~) oczf + .. . 
+ JT(1 - ocz~)( 1 - oczf) ... (1 - OCz1._1) ocz1. 
+JT+l(1-ocz~)(I-oczf) ... 
L oc(1- JT- 1'(1- OC)T- 1') 
x(1-ocz T) I-J(I-oc) . 
Hence if T < 00 we have 
lim lim gT(J, T, z) = lim lim gT(J, T, z) = 1, 
6--+1 T-+oo T--+oo 15--+1 
for r E { H, L}, and therefore 
lim lim G(J, T,z)= lim lim G(J, T,z)=b{[(UH_C)+b~(é-c). 
0--+1 T--+oo T--+oo 0--+1 
If T= 00, then 
lim gL(J, T, z) = lim gH(J, T, z) = 1, 
¿;~l ¿;~l 
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and therefore 
lim G(J, T,z)=bt:(UH_C)+b~(é-c). 
&-1 
Therefore (P4.1.3) and (P4.2.3) hold. I 
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